



Ancient Greek Mercenaries (664–250 BCE)¹

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Abstract

Greek mercenary service played a major role in the history of the Archaic and Classical ages (700–323 BCE) down to the early Hellenistic age (250 BCE). Mercenary service became more predominant in the Greek world in this period as the *poleis* (city-states) coalesced into more stable communities and coinage became more prevalent in the eastern Mediterranean. Greeks proved they were effective warriors in the later Archaic age and so found themselves in greater demand by the imperial powers of the east and the tyrants of Sicily in the Classical period. At the same time warfare became more specialized with the appearance of light troops and cavalry, often mercenaries from the periphery of the Greek world, on the battlefields of the Greek mainland. Mercenary service, like other aspects of Greek military life, reflected and influenced social, economic and political developments in the Greek world in the *polis* period. This article explores current debates about the origins, nature and general circumstance of Greek mercenary service and gives an overview of its history in the period.

Greek mercenary soldiers played a significant part in ancient Greek warfare and society. This was particularly the case in the later Classical age when the Greek communities struggled for hegemony in the Mediterranean in an increasingly violent and destructive environment. Recent research has done much to place mercenaries at the centre of the struggles of the peoples in the eastern Mediterranean in the period. Mercenaries were the product of social and economic developments in the fifth century BCE, like the spread of coinages and the decentralization of power in the Mediterranean Basin as the Persian Empire fragmented and the Greek cities became increasingly plagued by internal and external problems. They were instrumental in the rise of powerful and charismatic individuals through the fifth and fourth centuries BCE that culminated with the establishment of the empire of Alexander the Great and his successors.

The ancient Greeks employed several words for their mercenaries. *Epikouros* had an euphemistic quality, formerly used of Priam's Lycian allies in the *Iliad* (Homer, *Iliad*, 2.8.15, 3.456, 6.111, 13.755, 16.538) and used predominantly in the Archaic and early Classical age it described 'fighters alongside' or allies. In the absence of specific terminology for

mercenaries, allusions in the sources to men who provided auxiliary assistance on the battlefield appeared in terms of a ritualized foreign friendship (*xenia*) between foreigners (*xenoi*) and an allied relationship (*symmachia*) that blurred what may have been real mercenary activities in the seventh to the fifth centuries BCE. Coinage appeared in the Greek cities at the end of the Archaic age and with coinage came new terminology for those who received it as a wage (*misthos*), reward and recompense for military service. There may be a relationship between the appearance of coinage in western Asia Minor and the emergence of mercenaries from this region in the latter half of the seventh century BCE. There is little doubt that coinage facilitated the growth of mercenary service, for the great mercenary armies of the fourth century BCE could not have emerged without coins. Geoffrey de Ste Croix described ancient Greek mercenaries in this era as the first instance of large scale hired labour in antiquity.² In the fifth century BCE, Thucydides introduced the term *misthophoros* for wage-earning soldier, used predominantly in later sources. By the end of the fourth century, so many soldiers were professionals that the citizen amateurs rather than the wage-earners needed definition. At this time, *misthophoroi* dominated armies to the extent that the generic Greek word for a soldier (*stratiotês*) designated a professional rather than citizen amateurs, though it needs to be remembered that many armies continued to employ large numbers of citizen levies in the fourth century BCE, and the Achaean League certainly did so in the third century BCE.³

The first Greek mercenaries appeared in the Near East in the Archaic Age, possibly as individuals serving the Assyrian Kings. In about 664 BCE, thirty thousand Carians and Ionians from western Asia Minor found service with the Saite dynasty of the Egyptian Pharaohs (Herodotus, 2.163; Plato, 187b; Diodorus Siculus, 1.66.12). Some have suggested that the Carians invented large-scale mercenary service in the eastern Mediterranean at this time, and while the truth may be obscure, the Greeks probably believed this tradition (Ephorus, *FGrH*, 70 F 12; for further references see Lavelle, 1997, p. 240, n. 28). Contemporary Greek lyric poets sing of mercenary service. Archilochus claimed to be an *epikouros* like a Carian (Archilochus, 15.216) and saw his arms as the means of his livelihood. Similarly, a century later a Cretan named Hybrias sang a war song praising his arms as providers of his sustenance. Around 590 BCE, Alcaeus's brother took service in Babylon and won renown and reward. As the Greek communities coalesced into *poleis* so mercenary service appeared more frequently. The autocrats, often called tyrants, who emerged at the head of these new states in the seventh and sixth centuries BCE used hired soldiers to establish and defend their regimes. Peisistratus used the money he minted from silver mines in Thrace to hire mercenaries to seize power at Athens in 546 BCE (Aristotle, *Athenaiôn Politeia*, 15.1–3). Mercenaries were associated strongly with autocracy and tyranny in antiquity (e.g. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1311a). Arcadians dominated mercenary service in the

later Classical age and it may be that Sicilian tyrants exploited their relationship with Arcadian nobles to secure Peloponnesian manpower for their regimes in the early fifth century BCE (Pindar, *Olympian*, 6.7, 74, 101–105; Pausanias, 5.27.1). Nevertheless, with the appearance of the stable and dominant Persian Empire in the Near East and the disappearance of tyrannies throughout the Greek world, mercenaries disappear from our primary sources for about a generation at the end of the sixth century BCE and the beginning of the fifth.⁴

Our sources maintain that citizen soldiers, sailors and rowers alone repulsed Persian imperialism in the Aegean Basin and the Carthaginian invasions of Sicily at the start of the fifth century BCE. The Athenian hegemony that followed the defence of the Greek world against the Persians depended upon expensive naval supremacy. The poorer citizens who rowed in the Athenian fleet needed payment for their services in the relatively new coinage in a way that their socio-economically superior counterparts in the infantry did not. Naval pay consumed fortunes and set precedents that began to professionalise warfare among all the Greek communities. Daily wages paid to Athenian rowers guided the rates paid to hoplites and light infantry later in the fifth century BCE. Fourth-century evidence reveals considerable competition for the best crews, who received higher wages and signing bonuses (for example, see Demosthenes, 50). In addition to professional naval crews, there appeared through the fifth century BCE specialist infantry required by the cities to augment their predominantly hoplite (heavy armed) citizen armies. These specialists were generally mercenaries from the fringes of the Greek world that provided the archers (*toxotai*) and slingers (*sphendonêtai*) who supported the heavy armed citizen militias of the cities. The most common kind of specialist, the peltast (*peltastês*), originated in Thrace and wore little body armour. Xenophon, among others, uses the term loosely of a variety of soldier types; in general the peltast carried a wicker shield (*peltê*), javelins and sometimes a slashing sword (Best, 1969, pp. 36–47). Greek use of these specialists reflected the growing complexities of year round campaign warfare, and perhaps memories of the Persian invasions when the hoplite armies of the Greeks experienced the advantages of well-trained light infantry and cavalry. In return, the Persian governors of the western provinces began using Greek hoplites from the Peloponnese as bodyguards (*doryphoroi*, *somatophylakes*) and heavy troops (*hoplitai*). Thucydides hints at the presence of several thousand Greeks in Persian service from the third quarter of the fifth century BCE. These small units of Greeks in Persian service grew in number through the fifth century BCE as garrison and auxiliary troops for the governors of the Persian Empire.⁵

The conclusion of the Great Peloponnesian Wars unloaded many thousands of Peloponnesian hoplites onto the eastern Mediterranean. The pivotal event took place at the end of the fifth century BCE. The Great King of Persia, Darius II, had died in 404 BCE and his two sons fought

a civil war for mastery of the Persian Empire. The younger son, Cyrus (nicknamed ‘The Younger’) challenged his brother Artaxerxes with both native levies and a force of about 13,000 hoplites collected through his ritualized Greek friends (*xenoi*) predominantly from the Peloponnese. Xenophon, who went on the expedition, detailed the story in his *Anabasis*. The Persian prince paid these Greeks wages (*misthos*) and offered them rewards should he be victorious. The two brothers fought a decisive battle at Cunaxa near Babylon in 401 BCE. Although the Greeks won the battle, Cyrus was killed and with his death went any hope of replacing Artaxerxes. Without paymaster (*misthodontês*) or allies, the Greeks fought their way back to the sea and safety. Several important studies have shown the socio-political nature of this Greek army community in Persia as it had all the qualities of a Greek *polis*, including a council of general staff, an assembly of fighting men and an all but invisible train of women and slaves (see especially Nussbaum, 1967; Trundle, 1999). Xenophon’s *Anabasis* remains the single most important piece of evidence for mercenary service in the classical Greek world and George Cawkwell’s Penguin translation entitled *The Persian Expedition* remains an excellent starting point, while James Roy’s article contains a very good discussion of the expedition in its mercenary context (Roy, 1967; but also see Briant, 1996; Tuplin, 1999; Lane Fox, 2004). On its return to the Aegean region, the army briefly augmented the peltast forces of the Thracian chieftain, Seuthes, in exchange for a share of the plunder taken on campaign. The remnants of Cyrus’s Greek army subsequently joined Spartan service in 399 BCE in a war against Persia to free the Greeks of Asia Minor. It is possible that many of these men, by now called the Cyreans, returned to the Greek mainland with Agesilaus to fight against an anti-Spartan coalition at the Battle of Coronea in 395 BCE at the start of the Corinthian War.⁶

The Greek cities impressed by specialist light troops in the Persian armies used more light troops during the Great Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE). During the Corinthian War (395–387 BCE), Athens employed a force of peltasts known simply as the Foreign Band (*to xenikon*). It became famous when under the command of Iphicrates it inflicted a staggering defeat on a Spartan regiment (*mora*) of hoplites at Lechaeum near the Isthmos in 390 BCE (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 4.5.11–18). This success and other evidence has prompted many to surmise that ancient armies of the fourth century were dominated by peltasts rather than heavily armed hoplites. Much of the confusion stems from a passage in Diodorus Siculus (15.44) in which he states that in about 374 BCE, Iphicrates instituted several changes to the standard hoplite panoply, lengthening the spear, lessening body armour and reducing the size of the shield. So great were these modifications that from this time, hoplites were called peltasts. Modern scholars (following the arguments of Best, 1969) have rejected Diodorus’s statements. For simplicity’s sake it seems most likely that specialist troops, and especially peltasts from Thrace, found

service with the Greek cities of the mainland augmenting their hoplite based armies, while hoplites were in demand to augment the large and lightly armed levies of the eastern rulers of Persia and Egypt.⁷

The fourth century BCE saw a massive increase in the numbers of Greek hoplites entering mercenary service in Sicily, Egypt and western Asia. At this time they mostly came from Arcadia in the central Peloponnese, a region that has enjoyed a good deal of recent investigation.⁸ The evidence attests several large armies in both the east and the west, not to mention an increased number of references to Greek mercenaries in sources as diverse as military manuals (for example Aeneas Tacticus, *How to Survive Under Siege*) and forensic speeches (especially those of Isaeus). By the middle of the fourth century BCE, mercenaries had become so ubiquitous that a comic play could feature the first soldier of fortune in history as its main character. Sadly only four fragments of this play, jointly entitled *Fortune's Child* (*Tychôn*) and *The Soldier* (*O Stratiotês*), survive.

There have been several reasons advanced to explain the rise in the numbers of mercenaries in the fourth century BCE. These centre around the social, economic and political problems of the Greek mainland which may have pushed men outside their communities, forcing those with little or no resources to seek military service for others. The devastations of the Peloponnesian wars, not to mention the wars themselves accustoming men to military service, and the growing numbers of destroyed cities and exiles provided a ready supply of men for mercenary service at this time.⁹

The argument that these underpinned the rise in mercenary numbers (Miller, 1984) should be tempered by other factors that attracted men to mercenary service that have been noted by other scholars (Parke, 1933, p. 17; Bettalli, 1995, p. 141). Mercenary service drew men to it in the later Classical period. Theoretically, it provided sustenance and a daily wage at the very least for those who may have had problems making a living in fourth-century Greece. It is difficult to know how much money mercenaries could make in the Classical Age. Much hinged on whether mercenaries received travelling expenses (*ephodia*), food (*sitos*) or money for food (*sitêrêsion*) in addition to a wage (*misthos*). Wages were low, ranging from two obols to one drachma a day, but in exceptional times men could make very good wages. For example, Cyrus paid his Greeks as much as one and a half drachmas a day and between 356 and 346 BCE the Phocian generals paid high rates to mercenaries hired to defend them and the Pythian sanctuary of the Delphic Oracle (Diodorus, 16.24–31). Several references illustrate that generals (*stratêgoi*) received four times and company commanders (*lochagoi*) twice as much as the ordinary soldiers. In around 351 BCE, Demosthenes (4.28–9) suggested that the Athenians send a force to Thrace in which each man received only two obols a day for food (*sitêrêsion*). Their full wages he thought would come from plunder (*leia*, *laphura*). Plunder made mercenary service particularly attractive to

both employers and their men. Booty sellers (*laphuropoloi*) accompanied mercenary armies. These men sold the captured goods in order to enrich the generals and pay the men. The sale of human beings into slavery provided the most money in wars of the Classical period. Mercenary warfare encouraged offensive actions by armies, for an employer with limited resources had to plunder his enemies to pay his troops. Service abroad with the autocrats of the East attracted many Greeks. The idea of the East as wealthy with its rich monarchs and foreign luxuries seems to have been an obsession in Greek literature. Since the Archaic Age, the Greeks had associated eastern monarchs with great rewards.¹⁰

The internal problems of the Greek mainland and the monetary attractions of mercenary service aside, the most likely reason for the growth in mercenary numbers in the fourth century BCE was the rising demand amongst foreign and local employers for Greek mercenary troops. The increasing instability of the western regions of the Persian Empire required provincial governors to hire troops to defend themselves from their neighbours and from the Great King himself. The King required Greek troops to form a core of heavy infantry at the centre of his armies. Egypt was in constant revolt and its re-conquest took several attempts through the fourth century BCE by the Great King's armies, including thousands of Greeks and the best generals from the Greek cities. The Egyptians employed their own Greek forces, and even in 362 BCE, the Spartan King Agesilaus personally served two Egyptian rebel Pharaohs. At the same time, autocracy had reappeared in several Sicilian cities at the end of the fifth century BCE, fuelling the same need for mercenaries. The greatest of the Sicilian autocrats, the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse, employed thousands of Greek mercenaries not just in supporting his regime, but also in his wars against the Carthaginians. In response, the Carthaginians employed their own forces of Greek mercenaries against the Greek cities of the island, and by the middle of the century, they thought them to be the most warlike of soldiers anywhere (Plutarch, *Timoleon*, 30).¹¹

Academics have debated how mercenary soldiers acquired their arms. The question has important ramifications for the status of mercenary troops in the classical period. If most of the mercenaries in service provided their own equipment, then they would enjoy considerably higher status than poor men without resources who relied on an employer for their arms as well as their livelihood. The origin of equipment would determine the nature of their service and their relative freedom of action while in service or in taking work. There is evidence that some mercenaries supplied their own arms and armour. Alternatively, the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse provided arms for several thousand men in his service.¹² How common either instance was among mercenaries remains difficult to state, though it seems more likely that most mercenaries appeared ready-armed in a culture that idealized citizen militias with their own equipment.

Mercenary service in the late classical period had much in common with older associations of ritualized friendships, gift giving and aristocratic family alliances. Recent scholarship has done much to explore these associations in their general sense (Herman, 1987; Mitchell, 1997). Mercenaries were also closely associated with inter-state politics, friendships or patronage networks. Thus, Arcadian nobles are found associated with Sicilian tyrants in the early fifth century BCE (Pindar, *Olympian*, 6.7, 74, 101–105; Pausanias, 5.27.1). Similarly, Athenian commanders like Conon and his son Timotheos, Iphicrates and Chares all found service, some of it even state sanctioned, with the Persians. The networks and alliances of Cyrus the Younger illustrate their importance in organizing mercenary service. Cyrus's ritualized friends (*xenoi*) in Greece gathered the armies of Greeks who came on the *anabasis*. Xenophon was himself the *xenos* of one of the Greek commanders who was in turn a friend of Cyrus. Cyrus had assisted the Spartans in their war against Athens and called upon them to send troops for his campaign against his brother. In the fourth century BCE, Athenian generals served the interests of their state as well as those of the Persians. Similarly, family alliances facilitated mercenary associations. Inscriptions from fourth-century Cyprus show fathers and sons serving together (*SEG*, 31, inscription nos. 1549–1555). Other commanders used these associations to mercenary ends. Iphicrates married into the royal household of the Thracian prince Cotys. The Rhodian brothers, Mentor and Memnon, rose to the highest echelons of power in the Persian Empire in the 340s and 330s BCE. They had served the Great King of Persia as mercenary commanders and recruiters, but were also married to daughters of prominent men within the Persian court. Money facilitated the hiring and maintenance of mercenaries and made it more starkly remunerative rather than simply reciprocal, but it was still unlikely that any unknown or unconnected individual could simply join a mercenary army or commander without connections.¹³

Some of the earliest coinage may have been minted for mercenaries. Lydian kings identified themselves to their men as employer, patron and paymaster, and perhaps most importantly as the guarantor of the electrum coinage, the quality of which was often doubtful. It was no coincidence that the first individual from the mainland Greek cities to stamp coins with his own name was the Phocian mercenary commander Onomarchus around 350 BCE. Money acted as both wage and symbol of an employment relationship. Professional soldiers identified with their commander as their paymaster (*misthodontês*). In the fifth century BCE, this had been true of the various *poleis* that stamped coins with symbols that reflected the community's identity. Athenian coins showed clearly to their recipients that the coins belonged to the Athenians. Those who took the coin as payment saw Athena's head on one side and an Attic owl, olive branch and the letters Alpha, Theta, Epsilon, short for 'of the Athenians' on the other. Rowers, therefore, recognized the origin of their money. In the last

years of the Great Peloponnesian War, the Persians mocked the Athenian currency by stamping imitation coins with a Persian Satrap's head on one side and an owl with the letters Beta, Alpha, Sigma, for 'The King's' (*Basileus*) on the other. Egyptian pharaohs minted coins imitating Athenian models, but with their own specific legends (for example, the pharaoh Tachos) and symbols (like the papyrus plant). These coins were made for Greek mercenaries and left the recipient in no doubt about the provenance of his money.¹⁴

Mercenaries became a major factor in inter-state politics of the Greek mainland in the fourth century BCE and could make individuals and smaller states with access to money very powerful in their regions. Thus, Jason of Pherae became Lord (Tagus) of the Thessalian league and briefly around 371 BCE looked likely to dominate all Greek affairs with an army of elite mercenaries, paid according to their quality and fitness. Xenophon admires Jason's elite army that underlay his power. He was typical of the power that individuals could wield through money and mercenaries in the fourth century BCE (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 6.1.1–19, 7.4.20–32).¹⁵ Likewise, the Phocians dominated the affairs of central Greece in the 350s BCE by using the money minted from the treasury of the Delphic Oracle to hire a large army of mercenaries to protect themselves and the sanctuary (Diodorus, 16).

Professionalism, specialism, coinage and mercenary service seem to have emerged together as the fourth century BCE progressed. Several cities on mainland Greece created elite special units of full-time soldiers (*ephebes*, *epilektoi*), best illustrated by the Theban Sacred Band (*hieros lochos*), in recognition of the new age of specialization. There is evidence that some even armed their poorer citizens to function as specialist troops like peltasts and light troops (for examples see Thucydides 4.9.1; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.2.1). It ought to be remembered however that amateur citizen hoplite soldiers still predominated on the battlefields of the Greek mainland throughout the century. The battles of Mantinea II (371 BCE), Leuctra (362 BCE) and Chaeronea (338 BCE) were won and lost by essentially part-time and amateur soldiers.¹⁶

The rise of the Macedonians in the second half of the fourth century BCE saw the consolidation of money and aristocratic alliances. Philip II was both immensely wealthy and well connected. His son, Alexander III (the Great) developed a professional army during his campaigns against the Persian Empire. The Persians opposed him with at least fifty thousand Greek mercenaries. These men hated Alexander (and the Macedonians) and once again illustrate that mercenary service was an extension of political alliances as Persians and Greeks shared a common cause. Only Macedonian propaganda painted them as unpatriotic and mercenary. Alexander himself, however, hired mercenaries and established several communities in the east with many of these men.¹⁷

Alexander's successors of the Hellenistic age used professional soldiers to garrison their fluid kingdoms and to fight their wars. This was a new

age in which the citizen and the soldier were no longer necessarily identical. The term for soldier (*stratiotês*) now designated a professional rather than an amateur, though some armies continued to be made up of amateur soldiers. Evidence from this age also shows new types of relationships, the appearance of garrisons and military colonies (*cleruchies*) first established by Alexander. An inscription (OGIS, i. 266) details a contract between Eumenes I of Pergamum and garrison communities of mercenaries at Philetairea on the north-east frontier of the kingdom and Attaleia on the Seleucid frontier in around 260 BCE. There is nothing like this document from the earlier period. It illustrates a long service contract between the king and the army. The army swore oaths to the king to guarantee its loyalty. The Hellenistic Age witnessed the further decline of citizen amateurs on the battlefield. Armies of professionals protected their baggage train (*apokeue*) and their interests more than the cause for which they fought. As many more soldiers became professionals, the idea of mercenary service acquired a new image. The rise of Rome in the second and first centuries saw an amateur citizen militia defeat the professional armies of the Hellenistic Kings. Eventually the Roman army in turn became professional. Romans employed auxiliaries from the conquered peoples and viewed mercenary service with disdain. Their terminology defined the *mercenarius* as one who took *merces* or a wage, and their conceptions laid the groundwork for our antipathy towards mercenaries centuries later.¹⁸

In conclusion, Greek mercenary service sheds light on several aspects of Greek economic, social and political history, in addition to a variety of military developments. Current research looks closely at social and economic aspects of Greek mercenaries in the context of the Mediterranean world as a whole and in line with recent trends towards understanding Greek society. Mercenaries were an integral part of the Greek world that cannot be overlooked. Future research will provide more understanding not just of how mercenaries contributed socio-economically to Greek society, but how they defined what it meant to be Greek, facilitated networks and relationships outside of the Greek states and laid the foundations for the Hellenistic world.

Notes

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¹ There are several general works on mercenaries and warfare in the Classical Greek world including A. Aymard, 'Mercenariat et l'histoire grecque' in *Etudes d'histoire ancienne* (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1967), pp. 487–98; M. Bettali, *I mercenari nel mondo greco. Dalle origini alla fine del v sec. a. C.* (Pisa, ETS, 1995); P. Ducrey, *Warfare in Ancient Greece* (New York, Schocken Books, 1985), pp. 117–27, 129–35; G. F. Landucci, 'I mercenari nella politica ateniese dell'eta di Alessandro i soldati e uficali merceari ateniesi al servizio della Persia', *Ancient Society*, 25 (1), 1994, pp. 33–61; G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge,

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² G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London, Duckworth, 1981), p. 182.

³ On mercenary terminology, see P. Gauthier, 'Les *xenoi* dans les textes athéniens de la seconde moitié du Ve siècle av. J.-C.', *Revue des études grecques*, 84, 1971, pp. 44–79; B. M. Lavelle, 'Epikouros and Epikouroi in early Greek literature and history', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 38, 1997, pp. 229–62; B. M. Lavelle, 'Epikouroi in Thucydides', *American Journal of Philology*, 110, 1989, pp. 36–9; M. F. Trundle, 'Epikouroi, Xenoi and Misthophoroi in the Classical Greek World', *War and Society*, 16, 1998, pp. 1–12.

⁴ On early mercenary service in the Archaic Age, see Bettalli, *I mercenari*, pp. 33–111; R. B. Brown, 'Greeks in Assyria: Some overlooked evidence', *Classical World*, 77, 1983, pp. 300–3; P. Kaplan, 'The social status of the mercenary in archaic Greece' in *Oikistes: Studies in Constitutions, Colonies, and Military Power in the Ancient World. Offered in Honor of A. J. Graham*, ed. V. B. Gorman and E. W. Robinson (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 2002), pp. 229–43; Lavelle, 'Epikouros and Epikouroi', pp. 229–62; A. A. Snodgrass, 'Carian armourers: The growth of a tradition', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 84, 1964, pp. 107–18; Parke, *Greek Mercenary*, pp. 3–13.

⁵ On fifth century developments in mercenary warfare, see Parke, *Greek Mercenary*, pp. 14–19; Bettalli, *I mercenari*, pp. 115–39; Lavelle, 'Epikouroi', pp. 36–9. On money and naval warfare, see V. Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations* (Baltimore/London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); L. A. Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1–5.24* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1993). On Thracian peltasts specifically, see J. Best, *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare* (Groningen, Wolters-Noordhoff, 1969).

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